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RECENT DECISIONS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-CORPORATIONS--DOING BuSINESs.-Plaintiff, a Cali-
fornia partnership, brought suit against the defendant, a foreign corpora-
tion engaged in the manufacture of beer, for breach of an oral contract mak-
ing plaintiff a sales representative in California. Notice of the action was
given by service on the California Secretary of State as provided by statute
where foreign corporations doing business in the state have appointed no
other process agent. Defendant removed the action to the federal district
court where the summons was quashed on defendant's motion. On appeal
by plaintiff to the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, held, affirmed.
Defendant was not doing business in California within the meaning of the
statute' and was therefore not subject to service of process in that state.
LeVecke v. Griesedieck Western Brewing Company, 233 F.2d 722 (9th Cir.
1956).
At common law, jurisdiction could not be obtained over a foreign cor-
poration in an action in personam, unless the corporation voluntarily sub-
mitted to service, because a corporation was not considered to have legal
existence outside the borders of the state which created it.' This view is
illustrated by Pennoyer v. Neff,' which established that personal service
and voluntary appearance were the only means of obtaining personal juris-
diction over a non-resident defendant.
It was later recognized that, although corporations were to be con-
sidered persons for the purposes of suit, they differed fundamentally from
individuals. Personal service upon an agent of a corporation, while acting
in his capacity as agent, was recognized as valid personal service since cor-
porations, unlike individuals, can act only through their agents.' The same
case declared that a state might lawfully impose conditions upon a corpora-
tion doing business within its borders, one of which could be to require the
appointment of a "process agent." The authorization of an agent to re-
ceive process might be implied as well as express.
Shortly after the turn of the century the federal courts developed a
theory of "constructive presence" whereby corporations were considered
present in a state upon the performance of transactions by their agents so
as to be subject to in personam jurisdiction. In International Harvester
Company v. Kentucky' the United States Supreme Court considered the
quantity of transactions necessary to hold a corporation "doing business"
and therefore present in the state. The corporation in that case had en-
gaged in soliciting business and collection of accounts by check or draft,
and had shipped machinery into the state over an extended period. In
holding the corporation subject to service of process the Court stated that
it required something more than mere solicitation to make a corporation
present.'
'CAL. CoRn. CODE ANN. § 6203 (Deering Supp. 1952) : "'Transact intrastate business'
means entering into repeated and successive transactions of its business in this
State other than interstate or foreign commerce."
'See St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882) ; Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13
Peters) 517 (1&.39) ; Annot., 94 L. Ed. 1167 (1950).
95 U.S. 714 (1877).
'St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350 (1882).
'23 U.S. 579 (1914).
OThe Court distinguished Green v. Chicago, Burlington and Quincy Ry., 205 U.S. 530
(1907), which dealt with solicitation of ticket sales alone.
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The doctrine of Pennoyer v. Neff was extended to permit in personam
suits against foreign corporations by the use of theories of "implied con-
sent" and "constructive presence." The application of these theories con-
tinued unopposed until 1945 when the United States Supreme Court handed
down the decision in International Shoe Company v. Washington, which
by way of dictum suggested a more realistic approach to the problem and
discarded the legal fictions which are the bases of the former theories. The
Court said:
But now that the capias ad respondendum has given way to per-
sonal service of summons or other forms of notice, due process re-
quires only that in order to subject a defendant to judgment in
personam. if he be not present in the territory of the forum, he
have certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance
of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice. " . .. For the terms "present'" and "presence"
are used merely to symbolize those activities ... sufficient to satis-
fy the demands of due process. Those demands may be met by
such contacts of the corporation with the state of the forum as
make it reasonable, in the context of our federal system . . . to
require the corporation to defend the particular suit which is
brought there.
The Court then commented that it is enough that the corporation has
established such contacts with the state that the particular form of sub-
stituted service adopted there gives reasonable assurance that the notice
will be actual. Relying on Hess v. Palowski8 the Court went on to say that
the mailing of notice of suit to the defendant by registered mail at its home
office was reasonably calculated to apprise it of suit.
In the instant case, the court construed the local statute setting forth
the requirements of "doing business,"' but was influenced in its construc-
tion of the statute by doubts as to whether a contrary holding would satisfy
due process. The appellants urged the consideration of several elements
which they hoped would lead the court to decide that jurisdiction could be
lawfully exercised over the Griesedieck Company. These factual elements
consisted of annual promotional visits to California by Griesedieck's presi-
dent, provision of advertising materials without cost to the LeVecke part-
nership, retention of control over retail prices, commissions paid for new
accounts, and vesting in LeVecke of authority to settle disputes between
the purchasers and the appellee. Appellants also cited the trend toward
construing very liberally the activities within the state sufficient to subject
foreign corporations to suit. Among California decisions cited as supporting
this trend the most recent was Fielding v. Superior Court,' which rejected
strict adherence to the requirements of "doing business" set out in the Cali-
fornia statute.
The court of appeals in the instant case, after considering the cases relied
on by the appellants, quoted an earlier California decision' for the scope
'326 U.S. 310 (1945).
8274 U.S. 352 (1927) (statute authorizing service by registered mail on out-of-state
motorists).
'CAL. CoRP. CODE AN-N. § 6203 (Deering Supp. 1952).
"0111 Cal. App. 2d 490, 244 P.2d 968 (1952).
"West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 2d 726, 128 P.2d 780 (1942).
[Vol. 18,
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of the requirement in California and also as support for a position that
"each case must be decided on its own facts." The court then noted that
each of the cases cited by appellants contained elements which were not
present in the instant case. In the Fielding case the corporation retained
title to goods until they were sold by the distributor, whereas here all goods
were sold at the appellee's place of business in Missouri. However, the
court also relied on two recent California decisions' in support of the view
that mere substantial sales by an out-of-state manufacturer to a local dis-
tributor do not constitute transacting "intrastate business" within the
meaning of the California Corporations Code, yet in each of these cases there
are important factors lacking which are present in the instant case. For ex-
ample, in one case" the manufacturer did not control the retail prices, did
no local advertising and did not give its representatives the power to settle
claims and disputes in its name, elements which are all present here. In
the other case' the corporation did in fact supply local advertising to dis-
tributors, and a vigorous dissent citing the trend of International Shoe Com-
pany v. Washington and Fielding v. Superior Court attacked the failure of
the majority to take notice of this fact. The dissenter expressed the view
that such additional activity would subject the corporation to process. He
also called attention to the rejection by the Fielding case of the statutory
definition of "doing business."
By adherence to a stricter interpretation of the California Corporations
Code the federal court of appeals in the instant case has ignored the broader
rule adopted in California by Fielding v. Superior Court. Oddly enough,
the court claims that the scope of the law in California is stated by West
Publishing Company v. Superior Court' as follows:
[T]he business must be of such nature and character as to war-
rant the inference that a corporation has subjected itself to local
jurisdiction, and is by its duly authorized officer and agents pre-
sent within the state where service is attempted.
This same statement is relied upon in Sales Affiliates v. Superior Court,'
a case following the broader federal rule, as proof that California parallels
the federal courts in decisions of this kind.
For its federal support the court in the instant case reaches back to
1926 and Cudahy Packing Company v. Cannon Mfg. Company," in which
the appellant had brought an action against a subsidiary corporation and
the court ruled that the subsidiary was a separate entity, although admitted-
ly the capital stock belonged to the defendant, and therefore not an agent
so as to render defendant liable to service of process.
The conclusion of the instant case is best summed up in the words of
its opinion, that the result was reached "in spite of and notwithstanding
"Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 2d 259, 275 P.2d 146 (1955) ;
Martin Bros. Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 2d 790, 264 P.2d 183
(1954). See 23 AM. JUR., Foreign Corporations § 376 (1939).
"Martin Bros. Electric Co. v. Superior Court, 121 Cal. App. 2d 790, 264 P.2d 183
(1954).
'Estwing Mfg. Co. v. Superior Court, 128 Cal. App. 2d 259, 275 P.2d 146 (1955).
'CAL. CORP. CODE ANN. §§ 6200-6203 (Deering Supp. 1952).
"West Publishing Co. v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. App. 2d 726, 128 P.2d 780 (1942).
"96 Cal. App. 2d 134, 214 P.2d 541 (1950).
8267 U.S. 333 (1924).
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the re-examination of the requisites of due process [as found in Interna-
tional Shoe Company v. Washington].'
Case law in Montana is still at the stage prior to the International
Shoe case.' If the rather orthodox decision in LeVecke v. Griesedieck West-
ern Brewing Company is used as persuasive authority in the Montana
courts, adoption of the progressive and preferable "minimum contacts" test
will be unfortunately postponed.
WARD A. SHANAHAN
CRIMINAL LAW-INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER-UNLAWFUL ACT As BASIS
FOR CONVICTION.-Appeliant, while driving on the wrong side of the high-
way, collided with an oncoming gasoline truck and caused the death of the
driver. She was convicted of involuntary manslaughter based upon both
criminal negligence in driving while under the influence of intoxicating
liquor and upon the unlawful act of driving to the left of the center line.1
On appeal to the Montana Supreme Court, held, reversed and remanded for
a new trial. An instruction authorizing a manslaughter conviction for the
unlawful act of driving on the wrong side of the road is erroneous because
criminal negligence is an essential element of the crime of involuntary man-
slaughter. State v. Strobel, 304 P.2d 606 (Mont. 1956) (Chief Justice Adair
and Justice Bottomley dissenting).
Bracton's thirteenth century writings stated that criminal liability at-
tached for homicide committed by misadventure in the course of an un-
lawful act.' Coke recognized that homicide in the course of an unlawful
act was necessarily either voluntary or involuntary, but stated both were
punishable alike as murder.' Hale subsequently recognized a definite dis-
tinction between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter, and in his time
DPerkins v. Benguet Consolidated Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) ; Traveler's Health
Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643 (1950).
2"ontana case law is also limited to a few decisions on the subject. The theories of
"implied consent" and "constructive presence" appear in the companion cases State
em rel. Am. Laundry Machinery Co. v. District Court, 98 Mont. 278, 41 P.2d 26
(1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S. 744 (1935), and State eo rel. Taylor Laundry Co. v.
District Court, 102 Mont. 274, 75 P.2d 772 (1936). In the first case summons was
quashed where it appeared that the corporation's dealings were limited to several
isolated transactions. The corporation also was not shown to have appointed an
agent for the purpose of service of process. The second case was tried on findings
of new facts that the corporation had actually been engaged in continuous activity.
The sale of goods, replacement of worn out parts, and adjustments and repairs to
machinery enabled the court to infer that it was "present." By the time of the
second suit the corporation had a regular agent upon whom process could be served
in accord with R.C.M. 1921, § 9111(2).
The most recent Montana decision is State ex rel. Schmidt v. District Court, 111
Mont. 16, 105 P.2d 611 (1940). The corporation involved there had previously com-
plied with the statutory requirement for appointment of an agent upon whom pro-
cess could be served but failed to appoint a replacement when the original man died.
This case adhered to the theory of "implied consent" and certainly did, not require
a broad rule in view of the corporation's long business contact with the state.
The most recent decision involving a Montana party and a foreign corporation is
Clapper Motor Co. v. Robinson Motor Co., 119 F. Supp. 79 (D. Mont. 1954). The
court there relied on the older theory of "constructive presence."
1Rzvrsm) CoDzs OF MONTANA, 1947, §§ 31-108 (19), 32-1102, and 32-1104, statutes then
in force.
2 BRA ToN, DE Lumrus, 120b, 136b (1569) (written 1250's).
COKE, 3d INSTITUTE No. 56 (1641).
[Vol. 18,
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